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This paper investigates theoretically and empirically the endogenous investment de-
cision of rms conditioning on export decision. It shows that theoretically, whatever the
form of preferences, rms that start exporting invest more and grow more than the oth-
ers. However, it is shown that when preferences are CES, within each category of rms
(domestic and switchers), initial productivity and investment are strategic complements,
inducing intra-industrial divergence. On the contrary, when preferences are quadratic,
initial productivity and investment are strategic substitutes: less productive rms invest
more and grow more than the others, inducing intra-industrial convergence. Empirical
results on French data support the predictions of the quadratic preferences model.
JEL Codes: D21, D24, F12.
Keywords: export decision, investment, rm heterogeneity.
It is now well established that exporting rms are more productive, bigger and pay higher
wages than domestic ones. A large number of papers on dierent types of countries have
corroborated this idea. We can cite, among others, Bernard and Jensen (1999) on US rms,
Greenaway and Kneller (2008) on UK rms, Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008) on French
rms or Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) on Mexican and Colombian rms. A natural
question then concerns the nature of causality between export participation and productivity:
do better rms become exporters or does exporting improve rms' performance?
There are two stories in favor of the selection hypothesis. One can think that exporting
is costly; in particular, there can exist xed export costs, linked up with the research of dis-
tribution networks in the destination country or the adaptation of products to the tastes of
CORE. orian.mayneris@uclouvain.be
1foreign consumers for example. In a context of monopolistic competition  a la Dixit-Stiglitz,
more productive rms are the only ones to be able pay these xed costs. This is the expla-
nation proposed by Melitz (2003). On the other hand, as advanced by Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008), increased competition in a model with quadratic preferences could also explain the
self-selection of more productive rms on foreign markets: the existence of iceberg transport
costs makes that rms have a \competitive" disadvantage with respect to domestic rms
when they try to enter on foreign markets. Since it is optimal for rms to transfer transport
costs entirely to foreign consumers, the rms with lower f.o.b prices, that is to say the more
productive ones, are the only ones to export.
There are also two main reasons why rms could become more productive when entering
on foreign markets. The rst one is learning-by-exporting: as emphasized in Grossman and
Helpman (1991), exporters may benet from the technical expertise of their buyers. On the
other hand, some papers focused more recently on the correlation between the decision to
start exporting and the decision to invest in productivity or quality-enhancing activities. As
noted by Lileeva and Treer (2007), \it is hard to believe that there could be large produc-
tivity gains [from exporting] unless rms actively engaged in costly productivity-enhancing
investments such as the adoption of advanced manufacturing technologies, the use of just-
in-time production techniques, and product restructuring". Indeed, the revenues generated
by the access to foreign markets can be an incentive to spend money in improving produc-
tion processes or the quality of products, while such investments may not be protable for
domestic rms because of smaller sales. A few models have been developed in this direction.
Bustos (2008) introduces a dichotomous technology choice and Bas and Ledezma (2008) add a
continuous investment in a Melitz-type model. Verhoogen (2008) also builds on Melitz (2003)
to provide a model of quality choice at the rm-level. In all these models, entry on export
markets can be associated with rm-level improved performance.
Empirically, many papers nd supportive evidence for the selection eect. Bernard and
Jensen (1999) nd that US exporters are ex ante bigger and pay higher wages than domestic
rms; US exporters also tend to be more productive even though results are less striking.
Greenaway and Kneller (2008) and Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) also conclude to such
an ex ante export premium for UK, Mexican and Colombian rms. However, as stated by
Costantini and Melitz (2007), it could be the case that rms, planning to enter on export
markets, engage in productivity-enhancing activities before exporting. Hence, the positive
correlation between ex ante productivity and export decision measured in the papers cited
above could in fact be due to a causal impact of export decision on productivity.
The results obtained in papers that explicitly study the causal impact of exporting on
productivity are rather mixed: Van Biesebroeck (2005) and De Loecker (2007) nd a positive
eect of trade liberalization on Ivorian and Slovenian rms respectively whereas Clerides,
Lach, and Tybout (1998), Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Greenaway and Kneller (2008)
nd at most short-run eects. Here again, if rms anticipate their entry on export markets,
some of these studies may miss part of the eect by looking at immediate post-entry pro-
ductivity evolution. Moreover, all of these papers have in common to impose a homogeneous
response of individual productivity to export participation. However, Lileeva and Treer
(2007) show that following the US-Canada free-trade agreement, low-productivity rms were,
among Canadian new exporters, the only ones to experience productivity gains. Export par-
ticipation generated within-industry convergence. On the contrary, Bustos (2008) argues that
in Argentina, following the implementation of MERCOSUR, technology adoption and sub-
sequent productivity gains were concentrated among middle-range productivity rms, that
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Figure 1: Productivity distribution and export status in 1996
is to say most productive new exporters. Entry on foreign markets generated in Argentina
within-industry divergence.
In this paper, I shed new light on this recent debate about the heterogeneous impact of
export participation on rms' performance. In the theoretical part, I introduce investment
in the two main models of trade with heterogeneous rms. However, I do not endogenize
the decision to start exporting: I do not have any prediction about the relative productivity
of rms that start exporting (the switchers) with respect to domestic rms. This choice is
motivated by the data. Indeed, for French rms, contrary to what selection models predict,
the productivity distribution of switchers is not dierent from the productivity distribution
of domestic rms.
As shown in gure , whatever the TFP index and the denition of relativeness, the pro-
ductivity distribution of switchers is very close to the productivity distribution of domestic
rms1. The productivity distribution of exporters is more clearly shifted on the right but
the support of productivity distributions of domestic, switching and exporting rms are not
disconnected as theory would suggest. These results do not mean that the predictions from
models of selection on export markets are wrong; they rather suggest that the export status
of a rm is determined by more complex mechanisms than a \simple" selection on initial
productivity. This point has also been acknowledged by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008)
on French customs data and Armenter and Koren (2009) on US data.
1Two TFP indices are used, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and simple OLS, and two denitions of relativeness
are distinguished, the dierence to the median within 2-digit industries and the dierence to the median with
respect to the dierence between the 3rd and the 1st quartiles in the industry; this latter denition allows to
control for the way productivities are distributed around the median within each industry. A domestic rm
does not export neither in 1996 nor in 2004, an exporting rm exports in both years and a switching rm
exports in 2004 but not in 1996.
3The optimal investment decision is thus calculated conditioning on the export decision of
rms. I adopt a very partial equilibrium perspective. I focus on rms that stay in the industry
for a given time-span and study the evolution of their relative performance according to their
export decision. I do not deal with entry and exit of rms and their impact in terms of general
equilibrium.
Doing so, I also contribute to the literature that seeks to understand better the dierences
between Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) models, that are at rst sight so sim-
ilar. Indeed, I show that theoretically, export participation can induce both within-industry
divergence or convergence according to the specication of consumers preferences. More pre-
cisely, whatever the form of preferences, switchers invest more and grow more than domestic
rms. But in a Melitz (2003) framework, within each group of rms, more productive rms
invest more and grow more, whereas the prediction is completely reversed with quadratic
preferences. I argue that this is not due to dierent mechanisms at work in both models
but to the functional form of prots. The functional form of preferences determines the way
rm-level prots are related to productivity, which then impacts the relationship between
initial productivity and investment: prots are multiplicative with respect to productivity
when preferences are CES, and additive with respect to the inverse of productivity when
preferences are quadratic.
In the empirical part, I show that, conditioning on initial productivity, French data tend
to support the Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) framework: less productive new exporters have
higher performance growth than initially more productive ones, and these dierent perfor-
mances can, at least partly, be attributed to dierent incentives to invest.
Section 1 presents a brief review of the literature. The models are developed in section 2.
Empirical results are displayed in section 3 and section 4 concludes.
1 Export participation and heterogeneous productivity gains:
a brief review of the literature
Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) both introduce rms heterogeneity in models
of international trade with increasing returns, but they assume CES preferences for the rst
one and quadratic preferences for the second one. Quadratic preferences were introduced
by Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002) in a model of economic geography  a la Krugman
(1991) in order to verify that the results obtained in New Economic Geography models with
CES preferences were robust to alternative specications. It appeared that it was the case,
giving credit to the idea that the specication of preferences was more or less innocuous. At
rst sight, introducing rms heterogeneity does not change many things since, even if the
mechanisms at work are not the same, Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) yield
very similar results about the selection of rms on export markets and the intra-industrial
reallocations induced by trade liberalization. But the devil is in the detail and it seems that
both models are in fact much more dierent than what was thought. Baldwin and Harrigan
(2007) show for example that both models have very dierent predictions about the impact
of importer size on zero-trade ows and on the f.o.b price of producers. In this chapter, I
show that, conditioning on export decision, they also have very dierent predictions about
the link between initial productivity and performance growth.
Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) are silent about the impact of export
participation on rm-level productivity. In both models, rms draw an initial productivity
4that does not change over time. Trade liberalization has a positive eect on aggregate pro-
ductivity at the industry level through rm selection (the least productivity rms are forced
to exit) and intra-industry reallocations (exporters and more productive rms expand at the
expense of domestic and less productive rms). But there are no within-rm productivity
improvements. This is at odds with ndings on several countries cited in the introduction.
That is why recent papers have introduced in a Melitz-type model the possibility for rms to
improve their productivity through investment.
Bustos (2008) assumes that rms produce with one production factor, labor. There is
a xed cost of production f and a constant marginal cost 1
. After observing their initial
productivity, rms can choose a \high" technology and reduce their initial marginal cost by
a factor  greater than 1, but at a cost f, with  greater than 1 too. Since preferences of
consumers are CES, the revenues and prots of a rm are a multiplicative function of its initial
productivity. It then appears clearly that more productive rms can better amortize the initial
xed investment cost. There is a productivity threshold  for technology adoption. All the
rms with an initial productivity higher than  will choose the \high" technology. If the cost
of \high" technology is suciently big with respect to the xed export cost, the model predicts
that more productive exporting rms will be the only ones to use the "high" technology.
Trade liberalization, by increasing export revenues, lowers the technology adoption threshold
. Consequently, falling trade costs generate technology adoption among middle-range rms,
that is to say more productive new exporters and less productive continuing exporters.
Bas and Ledezma (2008) introduce a continuous investment in a Melitz-type model. After
observing their initial productivity , rms can make an investment I() and attain a produc-
tivity level [I()]
 , with  positive and smaller than 1. This last assumption implies that
for a given rm, investment has decreasing marginal returns. In their model, rms choose
their optimal investment by maximizing their domestic prots only. Here again, preferences
of consumers are CES and the revenues and prots of rms are a multiplicative function
of productivity. Consequently, more productive rms invest more and grow more than the
others and trade liberalization tends to increase the incentive to invest.
In both models, more productive rms invest more than the others and have higher pro-
ductivity gains. In that sense, we can say that initial productivity and investment are strategic
complements. Investment magnies initial heterogeneity of rms and creates divergence in
terms of productivity between exporters and non exporters, but also, within each category,
between more and less productive rms.
Verhoogen (2008) is related to this line of research. In this paper, the model is not
about productivity-enhancing but about quality-enhancing investment. Preferences are CES
and product quality and productivity are supposed to be complements. An increase in the
incentive to export is associated to heterogeneous responses of rms: initially more productive
rms increase their exports, produce a greater share of high quality goods and raise their wages
with respect to initially less productive rms. Trade liberalization is here again a source of
divergence within industries. Theoretical results are corroborated by the empirical analysis
of Mexican rms dynamics after the peso devaluation of December 1994.
However, these conclusions cannot be generalized. Indeed, Lileeva and Treer (2007)
nd completely opposite results on Canadian rms. They study the labour productivity
evolution of Canadian plants following the implementation of the US-Canada Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) in 1989. They nd that among new exporters, low productivity plants
experienced large gains while high productivity plants experienced no gains. They interpret
these results as higher TFP gains for initially low productivity plants. Indeed, these plants
5that experienced high labour productivity gains also invested more heavily in innovation and
technology adoption than the others over the period and increased their relative share on
the domestic market. To interpret these results, the authors propose a model of selection
into investing and exporting. As in papers cited above, Lileeva and Treer assume CES
preferences for consumers and monopolistic competition. A rm is supposed to have the
choice between two technologies. The investment cost is xed. The dierence with Bustos
(2008) is that for a given level of initial productivity 0, rms are heterogeneous in terms of
productivity gains 1  0 they can expect from investing in the \high" technology. The rest
of the model is very similar to Melitz (2003) and Bustos (2008): rms must reach a certain
productivity threshold in order to export, trade liberalization lowers this threshold and makes
it protable for some rms to invest and start exporting. But now, there are switchers all
along the distribution of initial productivities and mechanically, less productive switchers
experience higher productivity gains since they were further than the others from the export
productivity threshold. This theoretical framework allows the authors to rationalize their
empirical ndings. However, heterogeneous response is not really endogenized here; it is
rather exogenously assumed. Moreover, this heterogeneity in terms of productivity gains is
not really motivated. Why, for a given initial productivity and for a given amount or type
of investment, some rms should experience important productivity gains and some others
not? However, an interesting point of their paper is that, contrary to the conclusions of
papers previously analyzed in this section, export participation is shown to generate in the
USA intra-industrial convergence among exporters in terms of productivity. This debate is
interesting per se since it allows us to rene the analysis of the complex dynamics generated
by international trade within industries. It is also relevant from a political economy point
of view: indeed, whether export participation benets to high or low productive rms will
have dierent implications on the composition of groups of supporters and opponents to
liberalization policies.
2 Models
In this section, I show that convergence eects can be theoretically obtained without resort-
ing to a second source of heterogeneity. I nd that introducing investment decision in Melitz
(2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) generates very dierent results. Starting to export is
associated with higher investment and consequently higher productivity growth, whatever the
functional form of preferences. However, incentives to invest are shown to be heterogeneous
among rms, the form of this heterogeneity changing according to the way we model the
demand function of consumers. Within each group of rms (switching and domestic rms),
more productive rms invest more and have higher productivity gains when preferences are
CES. On the contrary, with quadratic preferences, less productive rms invest more and have
higher productivity gains. Consequently, both models predict divergence in terms of produc-
tivity evolution between exporters and non exporters but within each group of rms, the rst
one predicts divergence whereas the second one predicts convergence. Since forces in both
models are roughly the same and work in the same directions, it then appears that the choice
of the functional form of preferences is not innocuous in terms of predictions/conclusions.
I consider there are two symmetric countries, H and F and I analyze, without loss of
generality, the export and investment decisions of rms in country H.
62.1 Sequence of the game
I consider a game with two periods, 0 and 1. A rm draws an initial productivity 0 from a
distribution G(0) in period 0 and then produces for the domestic market only. At that time,
it also decides whether to start exporting or not in period 1. A rm that starts exporting
is called a switcher. Given its initial productivity and its decision about starting to export,
the rm makes a productivity enhancing investment I0(0) in period 0 which will increase its
productivity in period 1:
1 = [I0(0)]0 (1)
with 0 <  < 1. I consequently assume that for a given initial productivity, marginal re-
turns of investment are decreasing: while investing, one more unit of investment increases less
and less initial productivity. The way I model the link between investment and productivity
is the same as in Bas and Ledezma (2008).
The cost of investment is supposed to be paid by the rm in period 1. I assume that
investing consists in buying an imported investment good; the latter is freely traded and
elastically supplied by a big country. The other countries are consequently price-taker for the
investment good. Given these assumptions, I can ignore in the model the investment good
market, since from the point of view of rms, the price of the investment good is xed and
equal to pI.
I do not model the decision to start exporting; I consider it as given. In \traditional" trade
models with heterogeneous rms, the decision to start exporting is based on expected prots
on the export market, which are themselves a function of rm productivity. In reality, the
success of entry on export market will also depend on several other non observed parameters,
correlated or not with initial productivity: the adequacy between the characteristics of the
good the rm produces and the tastes of foreign consumers, the knowledge the rm has
of distribution networks in the destination country etc. The decision to start exporting
is thus endogenous to many other determinants than productivity, which can explain why
the supports of productivity distribution of domestic rms, switchers and exporters do not
exhibit the disconnection that heterogeneous rms models predict (cf introduction). This
endogeneity of the export decision is not a problem for my work. Indeed, I am interested in
the dierences in terms of performance growth between switching and domestic rms that
can be explained by dierent incentives to invest. Whether the decision to start exporting is
determined by initial productivity, networks of the entrepreneur abroad or a specic interest
of the entrepreneur for foreign markets does not matter.
2.2 A CES preferences model
2.2.1 Production
I suppose that there is one production factor, labor. In each country, there is a continuum of
rms indexed by their labor productivity level , each rm producing a dierent variety of
the same good. Firms compete under monopolistic competition.
1
 is the per unit labor cost of production. Since I am not interested in the entry/exit
dynamics of rms, I can ignore the xed cost of production.
In any period t, the production cost function of a rm is given by the following expression:





t=0,1. Since domestic and foreign countries are symmetric, I can simplify the analysis by
normalizing the wage level w to 1.
2.2.2 Preferences


















where h;f denote home and foreign countries variables, 
i is the set of consumed varieties
from country i, qi(!) is the quantity of variety ! from country i that is consumed at the
optimum and  is the elasticity of substitution between varieties (greater than 1). I denote
Q the basket of consumed goods.













where R is the total expenditure of consumer.
8Consumer utility is maximized for:
qi(!) = RP 1p 
i (!) (5)
where pi(!) is the price of variety ! from country i, R is the total amount of sales PQ













The demand of consumers for variety ! increases when the price of this variety with







We assume that information is perfect. Firms perfectly know in period 0 what will be their
environment in period 1; given their decision about starting to export and their initial produc-
tivity draw, they consequently choose their investment level in period 0 in order to maximize
their prot in period 1. The game we described in subsection 2.1 is thus solved through
backward induction.
We focus here on rms that have chosen in period 0 not to export in period 1. The prot







qd(1)   pIId(0) (7)
Given the demand function calculated in subsection 2.2.2, prot maximization with respect




































1   pIId(0) (11)
Given the link between initial productivity and post-investment eciency dened in equa-
tion 1, rm-level optimal price and output can be written as follows:
pd (1) = [Id(0)]
  pd(0) (12)
qd (1) = [Id(0)]
 qd(0) (13)
9pd (1) and qd (1) are functions of p(0) and q(0). We can note that for a given initial
productivity level, the higher the amount of investment, the lower the price and the higher
the output relatively to their levels before investment. I use these expressions to calculate
total sales and prots of domestic investing rm and I obtain:
rd (1) = [Id(0)]
( 1) r(0) (14)




Equations 14 and 15 show that investing increases the level of sales but decreases rm-level
prot by the cost investment. I can then calculate the level of investment that maximizes














where I suppose that 0 < 1
1 ( 1) i.e 1
 1 > , in order to ensure non explosive invest-
ments for the least productive rms.
Let's focus now on the determinants of investment for domestic rms. Not surprisingly,
the higher pI, the lower the level of investment: investment is a decreasing function of its
price. Ignoring general equilibrium eects, investment also increases with Q, the size of the
market. On the other hand, all else equal, the level of investment is an increasing function
of P. P is an index of the competitive pressure in the industry; indeed, the more numerous
and/or the more productive are the rms in the industry, the lower is P (cf Melitz (2003)).
In this model, rms set their price following a constant markup rule. They adjust to tougher
competition through quantities and not through prices. Tougher competition reduces the
quantity of good a rm can sell (see expression 5) and also reduces the prots a rm can make.
It consequently negatively aects its optimal investment choice. As emphasized in Aghion
and Howitt (2005), this is a \particularly unappealing feature of the basic Schumpeterian
model" which predicts that \product market competition is unambiguously detrimental to
growth because it reduces the monopoly rents that reward successful innovators". Finally,
all else equal, more productive domestic rms invest more and grow more than the others:
investment magnies initial heterogeneity of rms. Indeed, given the multiplicative form of
prots with respect to productivity, the more productive is a rm, the more revenues one unit
of investment generates. Since each unit of investment has the same price pI whatever the
productivity of the rm, more productive rms can better amortize the cost of investment.
2.2.4 Exporting rms
I now study the investment decision of rms that decide in period 0 to start exporting in
period 1. I follow once again a backward induction analysis. There exist per-unit iceberg
trade costs equal to (   1). Since I do not try to obtain predictions about the entry/exit of
rms on the export market, I can ignore the xed export cost. Home and foreign markets are
perfectly segmented so that rms can make their decisions for each market separately.
In period 1, at the opptimum on the export market, rms set the following price and sell
the following quantity:
px (1) =  [Ix(0)]
  pd(0) (17)
qx (1) =   [Ix(0)]
 qd(0) (18)
10Using these optimal price and output levels, I can then calculate the sales and the prot
realized by an exporting rm on the foreign market:
rx (1) = 1  [Ix(0)]
( 1) rd(0) (19)




As usual in monopolistic competition models with DSK demand functions, variable trade
costs are completely transferred to foreign consumers through higher output prices. Higher
variable trade costs increase the output price charged by producers and decrease the sales
and the prot they realize on the foreign market.
Since home and foreign markets are segmented, it is straightforward to see that an export-
ing rm will produce more and make more prot than a domestic one: activities on foreign
markets will just come in addition of domestic ones. Contrary to Bas and Ledezma (2008), I
endogenize the level of investment with respect to export status. Consequently, an exporting
rm will make its investment decision on the basis of its total activity, by maximizing the
following prot function:




The rst-order condition with respect to investment level imposes that an exporting rm
will follow the investment rule:
Ix(0) = (1 + 1 )
1
1 ( 1)Id(0) (22)
Since it can sell more, an exporting rm amortizes more easily its investment and will, all
else equal, invest more and grow more than a domestic one. It will do it in a proportionate
way, increasing its investment level by a factor (1 + 1 )
1
1 ( 1). All else equal, the higher
the trade costs, the lower the investment dierential between exporting and domestic rms.
The analysis conducted on the determinants of investment at the end of section 2.2.3
is still valid here. We can also note that a variation in  has an ambiguous eect on the
investment of exporting rms: on the one hand, an increase in  reduces the sales of rms on
export markets and consequently the incentive for rms to invest; this can be seen as revenue
eect. On the other hand, it has the opposite eect through an increase in P, i.e a reduction
of the competitive pressure (competition eect). The net eect of a variation of trade costs
on investment and rm-level growth depends on the relative magnitude of both eects2.
2.2.5 Within industry divergence
In the end, adding investment in a Melitz-type model generates within-industry divergence
at two levels:
 exporting rms invest more and consequently grow more than domestic rms,
 within both categories of rms, more productive rms invest more and grow more than
the others.
2The assumptions made in these kinds of models usually generate a positive net eect.
11Export activities and investment magnify together the initial heterogeneity of rms. This
is interesting from the point of view of the industrial dynamics induced by international
trade. It is also interesting from the point of view of the political economy of trade liberaliza-
tion: indeed, as usual, exporting rms will tend to be more favorable to trade liberalization
than domestic rms but moreover, if these results are veried, among exporting rms, more
productive ones should be more supportive than the others.
2.3 A quadratic preferences model
Assumptions about the production function of rms are the same as in section 2.2.1 but the
specication of consumers' preferences changes.
2.3.1 Quadratic preferences
I assume now that consumers' preferences are quadratic, as in Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse
(2002). In that case:









































where q0 and qi(!) are the consumption levels of the homogenous good used as numeraire
and of dierent varieties of the dierentiated good. ,  and  are all positive.  and  denote
the degree of substitution between the numeraire and the dierentiated good: the higher is 
and the lower is , the less substitutable are the homogeneous and the dierentiated goods.
On the other hand,  is an index of substituability of the dierent varieties of the dierentiated
good: the lower is , the more substitutable are the dierent varieties.
As in subsection 2.2.2, after solving the maximization program of consumers, it comes













where L is the size of population, N is the number of rms and  p is the average price at the
equilibrium in the industry.





( + N p)  pmax (24)
While in the case of CES preferences, the demand for a given variety is always positive,
the hypothesis of quadratic preferences and consequently of variable price elasticity implies






increases with pi(!) and becomes innite when pi(!) tends to
pmax.
122.3.2 Domestic rms
We focus here on rms that have chosen in period 0 not to export in period 1. We solve
again the maximization problem of the rm with respect to investment through backward
induction.







qd(1)   pIId(0) (25)
Given the demand function calculated in subsection 2.3.1, prot maximization with respect









































Low productivity rms charge higher prices, produce less and make less prot. Contrary
to the CES model, the markup diers across rms:












For a given degree of competition in the industry (pmax xed), less productive rms charge
lower markups, and for a given productivity, rms decrease their markup when competition
increases (i.e pmax decreases).
Given the link between initial productivity and post-investment eciency dened in equa-













































13I can then calculate the level of investment that maximizes domestic prot. Solving the
maximization problem is less straightforward than with CES preferences. I can however show

















The analysis of the determinants of investment is less direct than in the the previous
model but still remains tractable. Investment is a decreasing function of its price; indeed,
for a given initial productivity 1
0, an increase in pI must be associated with a decrease in
Id(0) for relation 35 keeping veried. Symmetrically, all else equal (ignoring in particular
competition and price eects), investment is an increasing function of the market size L.
Results are so far exactly the same as in the previous model. The analysis diers when
considering the impact of competition. Indeed, pmax (which is the \homologue" of P in the
previous model) has two opposite eects on investment:
 on the one hand, as in a CES framework, a decrease in pmax tends to reduce, all else
equal, the revenues of a rm and its incentives to invest. This is the eect generated in












 on the other hand, tougher competition tends to encourage rms to invest in order to







Hence, besides the classical Schumpeterian negative eect of competition on investment
described in section 2.2.3, we also have, when preferences are quadratic, a positive pro-
competitive eect. It points at the stimulating impact of competition on investment: when
competition is tougher, rms are incentived to invest more in order to restaure their mark-ups
and quantities. However, I show in Appendix A.3 that the global eect of competition on
investment is, in a Melitz-Ottaviano framework, negative and consequently not very dierent
from what it is in a Melitz-type approach.
Finally, relation 35 exhibits a negative relationship between 0 and Id(0): less productive
rms invest more and have higher productivity gains than the others. Note that this last
results is not driven by the partial equilibrium analysis. Of course, pmax is endogenous; it
depends on the number of competitors and their average productivity, and consequently on
the dynamics of entry/exit in the industry. However, the level of pmax is the same for all
rms, that consider it as given. Ignoring these general equilibrium eects consequently does
not aect the prediction of the model about the link between initial productivity and the
level of investment.
This prediction is in complete opposition to what we found with CES preferences. Since
the forces at play in both models work in the same directions, it seems that these opposite
predictions are due to dierent functional forms of the prot functions. When preferences
are CES, prot is a multiplicative function of . Given the relationship between initial
productivity, investment and productivity gains assumed in equation 1, one unit of investment
generates more additional prot for initially more productive rms. On the contrary, with
quadratic preferences, prot is an additive function of the inverse of initial productivity,
14which is sucient to reverse predicitions about the relationship between initial productivity
and investment.
These results show that even if models with CES preferences are very tractable, some of
their results are directly induced by the choice of the functional form. This latter is not as
innocuous as it can seem.
2.3.3 Exporting rms
At period 0, some rms may also decide to start exporting in period 1. They choose their
level of investment by maximizing the following prot function:







































When comparing equations 35 and 37, it appears clearly that for a given initial produc-
tivity, a rm that decides to start exporting will, all else equal, invest more and grow more
than a domestic rm. Indeed, as it can sell more, an exporting rm can better amortize its
investment. A variation in trade costs impacts rm-level investment through three dierent
channels:
 a revenue eect: all else equal, a decrease in  improves the accessibility of foreign
market. Potential revenues of the rm are bigger and this increases the incentive to
invest. In equation 37, this channel appears through the variable
(1+)2
1+2 L, which is equal
to 2L when markets are perfectly integrated and to L when trade costs are innite.
 a competition eect: a decrease in  will tend to increase competition and to decrease
pmax. As stated in subsection 2.3.2 it will in the end discourage investment.
 a penalty eect: ignoring investment, the prot of exporting rms on export market






. Trade costs impact prots on export markets as a penalty
on rm-level productivity: when countries are symmetric, the prot of a rm with
productivity  on export market is equal to the prot of a rm with productivity

 on
the domestic market. A decrease in  reduces the penalty and thus disincentives rms
to invest. This is summarized by the multiplicator 1+
1+2 in equation 37. Indeed, this
latter is equal to 1 when markets are perfectly integrated (no penalty), and tends to 0
when  becomes innite (which means that rms should make an \innite" investment
in order to export when penalty is innite).
The eect of a variation in trade costs on rm-level investment depends on the relative
strength of these three eects.
152.3.4 Within industry convergence
In the end, adding investment in a Melitz-Ottaviano type model generates within-industry
divergence and convergence:
 as in the model with CES preferences, exporting rms invest more and consequently
grow more than domestic rms,
 contrary to the model with CES preferences, within both categories of rms, less pro-
ductive rms invest more and grow more than the others.
Export activities and investment are strategic complements but investment and initial
productivity are strategic substitutes. This last result is clearly at odds with the predictions
of the previous model. It suggests a catch-up eect of export participation. This seems to be
corroborated by the results of Lileeva and Treer (2007) on Canadian rms. I now show that
it also holds for French rms.
3 Empirical results
In this section, I investigate empirically the existence of heterogeneity in the response of rm-
level performance growth to export participation (productivity, value added, employment
growth...); I verify that this heterogeneity can be explained by dierent incentives to invest. I
try to test directly some results or implications of the theoretical part in order to discriminate
between the two models I have developped.
3.1 Testable results
Three main results or implications of the theoretical part can be tested. One of them is
common to both models and the two others allow to discriminate between CES and quadratic
preferences.
Result 1: Whatever the form of preferences, switching rms invest more than domestic
rms.
In both models presented in the previous section, new exporters invest more than domestic
rms due to higher sales. I will test this result by introducing a dummy identifying switching
rms in the estimation of an investment function.
Result 2a: With CES preferences, within each category of rms (switching and domestic
rms), investment is an increasing function of rm-level initial productivity.
Result 2b: With quadratic preferences, within each category of rms (switching and
domestic rms), investment is a decreasing function of rm-level initial productivity.
To test this, I will introduce initial TFP as a determinant of investment. A positive
and signicant coecient would validate the Melitz-type framework whereas a negative and
signicant coecient would be in line with the Melitz-Ottaviano hypothesis of quadratic
preferences.
Result 3a: With CES preferences, switchers grow more than domestic rms. Moreover,
more productive switching rms grow more than the others due to higher incentives to invest.
16Result 3b: With quadratic preferences, switchers grow more than domestic rms. More-
over, less productive switching rms grow more than the others due to higher incentives to
invest.
Both models predict that switching rms grow more than the others because of higher
incentives to invest. To test this result, I will estimate the determinants of performance
growth at the rm-level: the coecient on the dummy identifying switchers will (in)validate
the existence of a switcher premium. If the explanation in terms of incentives to invest is
right, I expect the exporter premium to vanish (or at least to be signicantly reduced) when
controlling for investment. The presence of heterogeneity in switchers performance growth
will be investigated by adding an interaction term Switcher  TFP as a determinant of per-
formance growth, and alternatively by estimating the switcher premium for each quartile of
initial productivity separately. Again, if the explanation in terms of heterogeneous incen-
tives to invest is right, switcher premium heterogeneity should vanish or be reduced when
controlling for investment.
3.2 The data
I use French annual business surveys3 data (ABS), provided by the French ministry of Indus-
try. The data set covers all the rms with more than 20 employees, or some smaller rms with
sales higher than 5 millions euros over the 1996-2004 period. It comprises all balance-sheet
data (production, value added, employment, capital, exports, aggregate wages, investment
etc.) and information about rm location, rm industry classication and rm structure
(number of plants, etc.).
I conserve in the sample rms from continental France (that is to say overseas d epartements
and Corsica excluded) and from manufacturing industries that are present in the ABS each
year of the period 1996-2004.
3.3 Empirical strategy
The empirical strategy is based on a simple comparison of switchers and non-switchers invest-
ment and performance growth over the period under study. The denition of what a switcher
is is not trivial. Indeed, rms declare in the ABS their annual exports. However, some rms
declare very small sales on foreign markets, either in terms of value or in terms of share of
their total sales. Moreover, some rms alternate regularly null and positive export ows,
without any persistence in export activities. Consequently, to be sure that the switchers I
identify are rms that engage signicantly in export activities, I consider that a rm exports
when its annual total exports are bigger than 50 000 euros4. Moreover, a rm is said to have
become an exporter over the period if it did not export from 1996 to 1998, and if it exported
in 2004 or in 2002 and 2003 successively. A rm is considered as a domestic rm if it did not
export from 1996 and 1998 and if it exported at most once at the end of the period, in 2002
or in 2003. All other observations are dropped. Note that results are robust to alternative
denitions of thresholds and constraints in terms of persistence5
3Called in French \Enqu^ etes annuelles d'entreprises".
4This amounts to consider as zeros 12.6% of positive export ows in the sample.
5I also tried to dene exporters imposing a threshold in terms of share of exports in total sales (equal to
the rst quartile of positive observations, 3%), and to remove the constraints in terms of persistence to dene
switchers, a switching rm being dened as a rm that exports in 2004 but not in 1996.
17I adopt a two-steps empirical strategy. I rst estimate an investment function over the
period 1996-2004, keeping the empirical specication as close as possible to the theory. In
the models, rms take into account expected prots in period 1 to choose their optimal
investment in period 0, expected sales being determined by their initial productivity draw
and their level of investment. This is a problem for the empirical analysis for two reasons:
rst, we cannot explain rm-level investment between 1996 and 2004 by sales in 2004 for clear
reverse causality issues. Moreover, theoretically, initial productivity fully determines potential
sales and prots of a rm, and consequently rm-level investment: strictly speaking, rm-level
initial productivity should consequently be the unique rm-level determinant of investment.
This is not veried in the data: for a given size in terms of sales or employment, we observe
rms with very dierent productivity levels.
Consequently, I decide to estimate the following investment function:
invij1996 2004 = salesi1996 + tfpi1996 + switcheri + dj + i (38)
where invij1996 2004 is the average annual investment of rm i from sector j between 1996
and 2004. The measure of investment I use is o contribution and net of land investment. It
has two main limitations: rst, the information is missing for some rms and some years so
that total investment is not computed on the same number of years for all rms. This is why
I use the average annual investment over the period rather than total investment. Moreover,
we cannot distinguish between dierent types of investment (technology adoption, machines
purchases, R&D...). My measure of investment is thus potentially noisy.
Variable salesi1996 represents total sales of rm i in 1996, tfpi1996 the TFP level of rm i in
19966 and switcheri is a dummy that identies rms that start exporting during the period.
Theory tells us that investment also depends on the size of the market and on competitive
pressure: this is controlled for by sectoral xed eects dj dened at the 3-digit industry level.
 is the parameter thanks to which I can test Result 1 exposed in subsection 3.1 while 
allows to discriminate between Results 2a and 2b.
I then test Results 3a and 3b by estimating the determinants of performance growth
rate (TFP, sales, value added and employment) at the rm-level. The dependent variable is
yij1996 2004, the growth rate between 1996 and 2004 of variable y for rm i operating in
sector j; I estimate the following equation:
yij1996 2004 = yi1996 + tfpi1996 + switcheri + dj + i (39)
I control for the level of y and for rm-level TFP at the beginning of the period. I also
control for a 3-digit industry xed eect dj to purge rm-level performance growth from
inustry-level business cycles. The variable of interest is switchi. I consequently measure
the impact of export participation on performance growth by comparing switchers and non-
switchers with similar initial sales and TFP within narrowly dened industrial sectors. I
investigate potential heterogeneity of the eect by adding an interaction term switcheri 
tfpi or, alternatively, by running the regression for dierent quartiles of initial TFP level.
Contrary to some other papers on the topic, I do not instrument the decision to start
exporting. Indeed, I am not interested in some \learning-by-exporting" eects. Exporting is
6I estimate production functions at the 2-digit industry level following Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method.
value added is regressed on capital and labor. value added is deated by an annual branch price index and
capital by a price index common to all industrial sectors. The elasticities I nd are credible and range from
0.1 to 0.3 for capital and from 0.6 to 0.9 for labour.
18endogenous to many other things, in particular to investment decisions as emphasized in the
theoretical part, and this is what I want to capture.
In order to test the explanation in terms of investment, I then investigate if the inclusion
of investment in preceding regressions reduces signicantly the switcher premium and the
estimated heterogeneity.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Results on investment
I rst estimate rm-level determinants of investment. There are 2168 domestic rms and 739
switchers in the sample. All regressions contain 3-digit industry xed eects and standard-
errors are clustered at the industry level. Column (1) of table 1 shows that, as predicted by
theory, within a given industry, bigger rms in terms of sales invest more. This is coherent
with the idea, common to both models, that bigger rms can better amortize investment.
Column (2) also shows that, as emphasized in the theoretical part, switching exporters invest
signicantly more than domestic rms, probably due to better business opportunities: rms
that start exporting can sell more and have thus more incentives to invest. Result 1 is
validated. Finally, it appears in column (3) that conditioning on the initial size of a rm
and its export status over the period (switcher or not), the more productive is a rm at the
beginning of the period, the less it tends to invest annually. Result 2b is consequently veried:
this tends to validate the Melitz-Ottaviano hypothesis of quadratic preferences against CES
preferences in Melitz-type models of trade.
Table 1: Investment determinants 1996/2004
Dependent Variable: ln Annual average investmenti1996 2004
Model : (1) (2) (3)




Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.557a
(0.137)
N 2907 2907 2907
R2 0.322 0.331 0.35
Note: Standard errors in parentheses a, b and c respectively denoting signicance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 3-digit industry xed eects are introduced in all
regressions. Standard errors are corrected to take into account correlation at
the 3-digit industry level.
3.4.2 Results on performance growth
Table 2 presents the results about the heterogeneous impact of starting to export on rm-level
performance growth between 1996 and 2004 (Levinsohn-Petrin TFP, value added, total sales
and employment). For all indices except TFP growth, it appears in column (2) that switchers
experienced on average higher performance growth than domestic rms, conditionning on
initial performance level and initial TFP. The average switcher premium ranges from around
10% for value added and employment growth to almost 17% for total sales growth. Further
19investigation shows that performance gains generated by the entry on foreign markets are
heterogeneous: initially low productive new exporters experience larger gains than the others.
Indeed, the interaction term SwitcherLn LP Tfpi1996 is always negative (even though not
always signicant), and depending on the performance index, only the rst quartile, the rst
two quartiles or the rst three quartiles of rms in terms of initial Tfp experience signicant
performance gains when starting to export with respect to domestic rms. The switcher
premium is never signicant for rms in the last quartile of initial productivity. This suggests
catch-up eects linked up with entry on foreign markets7. These results on French rms
are in line with those obtained by Lileeva and Treer (2007) on Canadian rms. They are
also coherent with ndings in Konings and Vandenbussche (2008): indeed, they show that
domestic European rms that receive antidumping protection have higher productivity growth
than non-protected domestic rms, and that the eect is larger for initially low productive
rms. Higher incentives to invest are one of the explanations advanced to understand such
a productivity growth dierential. Konings and Vandenbussche (2008) results are symmetric
to my results on French new exporters.
We replicate in Table 3 the results of Table 2, controlling for rm-level average annual
investment over the period. Doing so, for all indices of performance growth and whatever the
sample (all rms or specic quartiles), the coecient on the amount of investment is always
positive and signicant and even if the switcher premium does not completely disappear, its
level decreases clearly and its signicancy is greatly reduced.
Result 3b seems to be validated. Switchers have higher performance growth than domestic
rms and this switcher premium is bigger for initially low productivity rms. Switchers that
are initially highly productive (rms in the last quartile of initial productivity) do not expe-
rience signicant higher individual performance than domestic rms with identical initial size
and productivity. Controlling for investment greatly reduces the size and the signicancy of
the estimated switcher premium. Dierences in export behaviour consequently partly explain
the heterogeneous performance growth dierential between switchers and domestic rms. The
predictions of Melitz-Ottaviano model with continous investment are again validated against
the predictions of the Melitz model.
Even if reduced, switcher premium often remains positive and signicant. Three explana-
tions can be advanced:
 Remaining premium is a\true" learning-by-exporting" eect,
 Switching rms were not exploiting at the beginning of the period their entire supply
capacity, and they could consequently increase their sales, value added and employment
without resorting to capacity-enhancing investment,
 The measure of investment I use does not allow to identify the dierent types of in-
vestments a rm realizes. The models were about productivity-enhancing investment
but rms can also make quality-enhancing investment or investment in \radical innova-
tions", with less clear consequences on productivity, sales, value added and employment.
The remaining switcher premium could thus be due to the fact that my measure of in-
vestment is noisy.
7In unreported results, I obtain similar conclusions on labor productivity.
20Table 2: Starting to export and 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Dependent Variable:  ln LP Tfpi1996 2004
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All All All 1st quart. 2nd quart. 3rd quart. 4th quart.
Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.352a -0.353a -0.318a -0.696a -0.533b -0.339b -0.162a
(0.050) (0.050) (0.040) (0.098) (0.243) (0.132) (0.047)
Switcheri 0.026 0.454c 0.085a 0.021 -0.007 -0.005
(0.022) (0.266) (0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.039)
Switcheri  Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.122
(0.077)
N 2899 2899 2899 724 726 724 725
R2 0.119 0.12 0.125 0.212 0.02 0.008 0.019
Dependent Variable:  ln Value addedi1996 2004
Ln value addedi1996 -0.118a -0.124a -0.129a -0.192a -0.179a -0.130a -0.115a
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.062) (0.042) (0.044) (0.031)
Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.078 -0.076 -0.019 -0.462a -0.306 0.184 0.090
(0.063) (0.062) (0.053) (0.107) (0.388) (0.270) (0.073)
Switcher 0.098a 0.731b 0.167a 0.110a 0.079 -0.005
(0.035) (0.321) (0.052) (0.042) (0.055) (0.066)
Switcheri  Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.180c
(0.092)
N 2907 2907 2907 726 728 726 727
R2 0.037 0.045 0.05 0.133 0.047 0.02 0.021
Dependent Variable:  ln Total salesi1996 2004
Ln Total salesi1996 -0.066a -0.081a -0.084a -0.169a -0.092a -0.058c -0.049c
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.039) (0.033) (0.032) (0.029)
Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.021 -0.014 0.030 -0.079 -0.108 -0.012 -0.010
(0.033) (0.033) (0.039) (0.073) (0.317) (0.276) (0.076)
Switcheri 0.167a 0.668b 0.235a 0.185a 0.181a 0.041
(0.032) (0.263) (0.077) (0.049) (0.044) (0.057)
Switcheri  Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.143b
(0.071)
N 2907 2907 2907 726 728 726 727
R2 0.012 0.036 0.04 0.08 0.037 0.033 0.009
Dependent Variable:  ln Employmenti1996 2004
Ln employmenti1996 -0.147a -0.150a -0.152a -0.197a -0.20a -0.149a -0.142a
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.039) (0.031) (0.033) (0.027)
Ln LP Tfpi1996 0.139a 0.136a 0.158a -0.014 0.023 0.442c 0.127b
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.080) (0.266) (0.250) (0.054)
Switcheri 0.082a 0.348c 0.093a 0.097a 0.103a -0.001
(0.021) (0.187) (0.033) (0.033) (0.036) (0.053)
Switcheri  Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.076
(0.054)
N 2907 2907 2907 726 728 726 727
R2 0.056 0.065 0.067 0.079 0.081 0.052 0.073
Note: Standard errors in parentheses a, b and c respectively denoting signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
3-digit industry xed eects in all regressions. Standard errors are corrected to take into account correlation
at the 3-digit industry level.
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Dependent Variable:  ln TFPi1996 2004
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All 1st quart. 2nd quart. 3rd quart. 4th quart.
Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.365a -0.331a -0.701a -0.531b -0.40a -0.167a
(0.050) (0.041) (0.094) (0.242) (0.131) (0.050)
Switcheri 0.017 0.424 0.066b 0.019 -0.022 -0.008
(0.023) (0.274) (0.033) (0.026) (0.031) (0.040)
Ln average annual investmenti1996 2004 0.022a 0.021a 0.039b 0.004 0.035a 0.016c
(0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010)
Switcher  Ln LP Tfp i1996 -0.116
(0.080)
N 2899 2899 724 726 724 725
R2 0.125 0.13 0.223 0.02 0.024 0.023
Dependent Variable:  ln Value addedi1996 2004
Ln value addedi1996 -0.329a -0.333a -0.452a -0.312a -0.456a -0.274a
(0.029) (0.028) (0.052) (0.056) (0.050) (0.044)
Ln LP Tfpi1996 0.072 0.127b -0.276a -0.140 0.207 0.243a
(0.052) (0.051) (0.080) (0.350) (0.234) (0.047)
Switcher 0.040 0.649c 0.081b 0.068c 0.007 -0.036
(0.033) (0.342) (0.038) (0.039) (0.046) (0.069)
Ln average annual investmenti1996 2004 0.175a 0.175a 0.247a 0.120a 0.260a 0.141a
(0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.042) (0.026) (0.023)
Switcher Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.173c
(0.099)
N 2907 2907 726 728 726 727
R2 0.162 0.167 0.301 0.131 0.217 0.102
Dependent Variable:  ln Total salesi1996 2004
Ln Total salesi1996 -0.260a -0.262a -0.372a -0.240a -0.312a -0.194a
(0.022) (0.022) (0.050) (0.044) (0.038) (0.038)
Ln LP Tfpi1996 0.084b 0.125a -0.044 0.078 -0.034 0.114c
(0.033) (0.043) (0.079) (0.281) (0.256) (0.059)
Switcheri 0.124a 0.594b 0.163a 0.152a 0.120a 0.026
(0.029) (0.268) (0.062) (0.042) (0.037) (0.060)
Ln average annual investmenti1996 2004 0.176a 0.176a 0.244a 0.139a 0.243a 0.137a
(0.021) (0.021) (0.031) (0.045) (0.028) (0.025)
Switcher Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.134c
(0.076)
N 2907 2907 726 728 726 727
R2 0.163 0.166 0.235 0.126 0.219 0.114
Dependent Variable:  ln Employmenti1996 2004
Ln employmenti1996 -0.258a -0.260a -0.330a -0.271a -0.336a -0.224a
(0.018) (0.017) (0.030) (0.035) (0.033) (0.030)
Ln LP Tfpi1996 0.106a 0.127a -0.038 0.062 0.223 0.130a
(0.023) (0.028) (0.079) (0.237) (0.216) (0.040)
Switcheri 0.035c 0.280 0.032 0.062b 0.045c -0.029
(0.019) (0.182) (0.026) (0.031) (0.027) (0.055)
Ln average annual investmenti1996 2004 0.122a 0.122a 0.152a 0.087a 0.180a 0.103a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.018)
SwitcheriLn LP Tfpi1996 -0.070
(0.053)
N 2907 2907 726 728 726 727
R2 0.18 0.181 0.22 0.156 0.219 0.166
Note: Standard errors in parentheses a, b and c respectively denoting signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
3-digit industry xed eects in all regressions. Standard errors are corrected to take into account correlation
at the 3-digit industry level.
224 Conclusion
In this paper, I shed new light on the debate about the relationship between productivity and
starting to export. I introduce investment in theoretical frameworks  a la Melitz and Melitz-
Ottaviano and I show that they yield very dierent predictions: in both models, new exporters
invest more and grow more than domestic rms, but in the rst one, initial productivity
and investment are complements whereas they are substitutes in the second one. Even if
quadratic preferences generate a pro-competitive eect that is not at work in models with CES
preferences, economic forces play in the same direction in both models. Predictions are thus
dierent because of the functional form of prot with respect to initial productivity, which is
multiplicative in the CES model and additive with respect to the inverse of initial productivity
in the other one. Empirical results on French rm-level data tend to support the predictions
of the quadratic preferences model: new exporters grow more, in terms of productivity, total
value added, sales and employment than domestic rms, and this dierential is stronger for
initially low productive rms. Controlling for investment tends to reduce the heterogeneous
impact of starting to export.
My results need further investigation: I should theoretically test further the role of the
functional form of prot by introducing investment in a model with preferences  a la Behrens
and Murata (2007). I should also test if the predictions I have with quadratic preferences
could not be obtained in a CES framework when returns to investment are strongly decreasing
with initial productivity. From an empirical point of view, I should collect better data on
investment in order to test more directly theoretical predictions.
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24A Investment and quadratic preferences
A.1 Domestic rms











  pI = 0 (40)
We search for the roots of a polynom in Id(0) of degree (2 + 1). We do not know how
to solve such an equation. However, taking the problem symmetrically, we can note that
equation 40 is a polynom in 0 of degree 2. There are at most two real solutions. When they

































The solution will be the prot maximizing one if equation 40 is veried and
2d(1)
2Id[0] (Id[0]) <
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, positive for smaller val-





 is the maximum
of the rst derivative. When Id(0) tends to 0, the rst derivative tends to  1 and when
Id(0) tends to +1, the rst derivative tends to  pI. When its maximum is positive, there
are consequently two values for which the rst derivative is null, and the one corresponding
to the optimal investment will necessarily be, for a given  the higher one, that is to say the
one corresponding to equation 42.
A.2 Exporting rms
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25A.3 Investment and competition

















When dened, this expression is clearly negative: all else equal, an increase in pmax tends
to reduce 1
0. Since initial productivity and investment are negatively correlated, this means
that for a given initial productivity, a reduction in competitive pressure increases investment.
The net eect of competition on investment is thus negative.
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